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Varios modelos recientes de comercio internacional con firmas heterogéneas predicen 
que la apertura al comercio reduce el número de firmas, aumenta el tamaño promedio 
de las firmas y reduce sus márgenes de ganancia. Este trabajo utiliza información de 28 
industrias manufactureras y 46 países para analizar empíricamente estas predicciones. 
Los resultados de un análisis de diferencia en diferencia muestran que, en promedio, las 
liberalizaciones comerciales no han reducido el número de firmas ni han aumentado su 
tamaño promedio. Los márgenes de ganancia tienden a reducirse durante los tres 
primeros años luego de la liberalización comercial. Finalmente, se encuentra que el 
número de firmas y su tamaño promedio aumentan en aquellas industrias donde la 






Recent models of trade with firm heterogeneity predict that opening to trade reduces the 
number of firms, increases the average size of firms, and decreases firms’ markups. This 
paper uses a large dataset for 28 manufacturing industries and 46 countries to test these 
predictions. The econometric analysis based on the treatment effects literature shows 
that on average, trade liberalizations do not decrease the number of firms nor increase 
the average size of firms. Markups appear to decrease during the three years after the 
liberalization. We also find that the number of firms and the average size of firms 
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1. Introduction 
Recent models of international trade with firm heterogeneity (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al, 
2003; Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) predict that when 
countries move from autarky to free trade, the number of domestic firms decreases, their size 
increases, and their markups decrease. This paper tests these three predictions using a 
treatment effects approach and a large panel data for 28 manufacturing industries in more than 
40 countries. 
  We identify the effects of trade reform on these three variables using a difference in 
difference methodology which compares the effects of trade reform on industry dynamics in 
liberalizing countries before and after the reform relative to a group of control countries. The 
central contribution of this paper is the use of this difference in difference approach, which has 
been rarely used in empirical studies of trade liberalization and has never been used to examine 
the questions in this paper.1 
  A few empirical studies have examined the effects of opening to trade on the number of 
firms, their size, and markups by focusing on particular episodes of trade reform.2 These 
empirical studies analyze the effects of trade reforms by comparing the variables of interest 
                                                 
1 Two recent studies that use difference-in-difference estimation are Slaughter (2001), which examines the effects 
of trade liberalization on per capita income convergence, and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), which studies the 
effects of economic and political liberalizations on economic performance. 
2 Most empirical studies focus on developing countries. For example, the edited volume by Roberts and Tybout 
(1996) presents a series of empirical studies that examine the effects of trade reforms on plant turnover, average 
size, and markups, and includes countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Morocco. Other studies include 
Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey, Harrison (1994) for Cote d'Ivoire, and Krishna and Mitra (1998) for India. Studies for 
developed countries are scarce and include Katics and Petersen (1994), and Co (2001) for the US, and Chen, Imbs 
and Scott (2006) for the EU. For a survey see Tybout (2003).  
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before and after the reform. Our paper builds on these important existing studies of particular 
cases of liberalization and complements their evidence. We are not aware of any previous 
empirical work testing these hypotheses using a large number of countries and industries as we 
do. 
  The impact of trade liberalization on economic performance is an important and 
controversial issue. Although most of the cross-country empirical literature finds that more 
open economies grow faster,3 some scholars are skeptical to the robustness of this result (e.g., 
Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). Moreover, these studies do not identify the specific mechanisms 
by which trade openness may affect growth (Edwards, 1993; Hallak and Levinsohn, 2004). 
López (2005), on the other hand, argues that a careful examination of the new microeconomic 
evidence showing that exporting firms are more productive than non-exporters reveals that 
exporting, and openness in general, increases productivity growth. 
  This paper focuses on the implications of recent models of trade with firm heterogeneity, 
which predict that trade liberalizations could generate significant across and within-industry 
reallocation effects. These models show that opening to trade may generate the traditional 
resources reallocation from comparative disadvantage to comparative advantage industries, and 
also from less to more productive firms within industries.4 In a seminal paper, Melitz (2003) 
presents a model with one factor of production and one sector, with constant markups, and 
                                                 
3 Examples include Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), and Frankel and Romer (1999). For 
recent surveys see Lewer and Van den Berg (2003) and López (2005). 
4 Given that we only observe the number of establishments in the dataset, we cannot study the effects on entry 
and exit. As explained in detail in the theoretical section this is not a serious problem because there are 
implications of the new trade models on the number of establishments at the industry level.  
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shows that in the presence of firm productivity heterogeneity trade openness generates 
important within-industry reallocation effects. In particular, exposure to trade reduces the mass 
of firms and increases average firm size. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) extend the Melitz 
model by considering two factors and two goods, and show that these effects are proportionally 
larger in comparative advantage industries. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) construct a model with 
endogenous markups across firms. This model predicts that opening to trade reduces markups, 
highlighting the potential pro-competitive effect of trade liberalizations. 
  This paper examines these three implications using a treatment effects approach in which 
we classify countries into two groups: those that received the treatment, i.e., liberalized their 
trade during the period under consideration, and those that did not liberalize during the period, 
the control group. This technique allows us to identify the effects of trade reforms on the 
number of firms, their size, and markups. Since the treatment effects may not be constant over 
time, we also estimate the effects using the methodology recently proposed by Laporte and 
Windmeijer (2005), which allows the treatment effects to vary over time before and after the 
treatment occurs. 
  The data comes from the last actualization of the UNIDO dataset (see Nicita and Olarreaga, 
2007) and details information at the 3-digit ISIC level. After removing incomplete observations 
and data inconsistencies, we end up with data for 46 countries during the period 1981-2004. 
Our treatment variable corresponds to the trade liberalization episodes defined by Sachs and 
Warner (1995) and later extended by Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  
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  The main results of the paper are the following. When we assume constant treatment 
effects, we find some evidence consistent with the idea that increases in trade exposure increase 
the average size of firms in comparative advantage industries. But the estimates for the number 
of establishments are the opposite of what we expected. When time-varying treatment effects 
are considered we find that trade reforms increase the average size in the year of liberalization 
and it increases in comparative advantage industries during the year before the trade 
liberalization. We find that markups decrease after the reforms, which confirms findings from 
previous studies that focus on particular episodes of trade reforms. The results for the number 
of firms show that trade reforms increase the number of firms in comparative advantage 
industries. 
 
2.  Predictions of the Theory 
  Traditional models of international trade predict that opening the country to international 
trade induces a reallocation of resources across sectors. These models are, however, silent about 
the effects of trade on the number of firms and the average firm size. And since these models 
assume perfect competition, firms’ markup, i.e., the ratio between price (p) and marginal costs 
(c), is always one. In the Ricardian model for example, trade induces countries to completely 
specialize in the production of the good in which they have a comparative labor-productivity 
advantage, while in the Heckscher-Ohlin model trade induces a shift in resources toward the 
sectors that draw upon the abundant factor. While the output of comparative advantage sectors  
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should increase, it is not clear whether this increase should come from entry of new firms into 
these sectors or from an expansion of the existing firms. 
  The new trade theory of the 1980s, based on models of monopolistic competition, assumes 
the existence of identical firms, each one producing a different variety of a product. Since firms 
have symmetric technologies, opening to trade induces all firms to export to all countries. In 
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Since trade liberalizations are likely to increase ε , markups should fall. Head and Ries (1999) 
use the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model of monopolistic competition to show that a tariff 
increases the number of plants but has no effect on output per plant. Thus, opening to trade 
would reduce the number of plants but would not affect the average size. 
  Starting during the second half of the 1990s, several papers show that exporters are more 
productive and larger than non-exporters.5 They also pay higher wages and are more capital 
intensive. Moreover, most empirical studies find that firms self-select into export markets: only 
the more productive firms could export.6 These new stylized facts motivated the development 
of new trade models based on firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity. One of the first 
models in this literature is Melitz (2003). In this model there is a continuum of firms each one 
producing a different variety of a good. Preferences are of Dixit-Stiglitz type with a constant 
elasticity of substitution (σ ), and fixed markups. Labor is the only factor of production. Firms 
have to make an initial investment before entry to the market, and then they learn their 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), Aw et al. (2000), Isgut (2001), Alvarez and López (2005). 
6 See, for instance, Clerides et al. (1998), and Bernard and Jensen (1999).  
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productivity level and decide whether to produce or exit immediately. In autarky, the mass of 










where L is the endowment of labor, π  is the average profit level and f is the fixed cost of 
production. In the open economy version of the model, firms make an initial fixed investment 
in order to export. Since not all firms can afford the entry cost, only the more productive firms 
export. In addition, more firms, the ones with high productivity draws, start producing the 
good. The expansion of exporters and the entry of new firms increase the demand for labor, 
which bids up the real wage and forces the least productive firms to exit. This reallocation of 
resources increases average productivity and average profits per firm. The increase in average 
profits implies that the average output per firm is also higher. In the trading equilibrium, the 











where  () T π π >  is the average profit in the open economy, px is the ex-ante probability that one 
successful entrant will export, n is the number of countries minus one, and fx is the fixed cost of 
exporting. From (1) with (2) it is clear that:  T M < A M . Therefore, the number of firms in a 
country decreases after trade is liberalized. 
  Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) extend the Melitz model by allowing endogenous markups 
across firms. This model predicts that opening to trade reduces markups, highlighting in this  
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way the potential pro-competitive effects of trade liberalizations. As in Melitz, trade reduces 
the number of firms and increases their size. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) introduce an 
additional industry and factor of production into the Melitz model with constant markups. 
Here comparative advantage plays an important role in determining the pattern of trade. The 
model can explain why some countries export more in certain industries, while at the same 
time intra-industry trade exists. Moving from autarky to (costly) trade increases firm size and 
reduces the number of firms. But these effects are not the same across industries. Average firm 
output increases more in comparative advantage industries, while the largest decrease in the 
number of firms occurs in comparative advantage industries. 
  A different type of trade model with heterogeneous firms was introduced by Bernard et al. 
(2003), who assume stochastic firm productivity in the multi-country Ricardian model 
developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002). Unlike Melitz (2003), this model does not assume a 
fixed markup and a fixed cost of entry and exporting. Firms (domestic and foreign) compete to 
produce the same variety, which generates an endogenous distribution of markups. The model 
and the counterfactual experiments predict that a decrease in trade barriers reduces the number 
of firms, increases average productivity but does not affect markups. The simulations also show 
that a 5-percent decrease in trade barriers decreases the number of firms by 3.3% while 
employment in the industry falls by 1.3%. Since employment falls less than the number of 
firms, average employment per firm goes up. 
  The degree of uncertainty with respect to technologies does not seem to affect the main 
predictions of these models. While Melitz (2003) assumes that technologies are randomly  
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assigned to firms, Yeaple (2005) assumes that firms can choose between two technologies (a 
low-cost and a high-cost technology). These technologies use workers with different skills, 
which are completely observed by the firms. In Yeaple (2005) there are two industries: a 
differentiated manufactured good and a homogenous good. Preferences are Dixit-Stiglitz type 
with constant markups. A reduction in trade costs reduces the number of varieties produced in 
each country. Since each variety is produced by a single firm, the number of firms decreases, 
and sales concentration increases. 
  All these models are, however, static. If one allows for dynamics, the results may change in 
some ways. For example, Emami-Namini and López (2008) extend the Melitz (2003) model by 
introducing physical capital as a second factor of production, and assume dynamic optimizing 
behavior of households. The model examines two cases. It first considers Melitz (2003) 
approach of assuming random technologies. In this case, trade may increase or decrease the 
number of firms. Second, the model allows firms to choose between two technologies:7 a high-
tech and a low-tech technology. In this second case, trade always generates an increase in the 
number of operating firms. In this model opening to trade generates two selection processes. In 
the first selection process, trade allows some firms to export, increasing the price of capital and 
thereby reducing the number of domestic firms. The average size increases as some firms now 
produce for international markets. In the second selection process, entry and exit of firms is 
determined by the effects of trade on the average firm. In the random technologies case, if the 
                                                 
7 This follows López (2005) argument that firms, at least in developing countries, may choose their technologies 
when targeting export markets.  
  10
average firm benefits from trade, there will be additional entry of high-tech firms, generating a 
positive growth effect. But if the average firm loses, there will be a negative effect. Thus, the 
number of firms may increase or decrease. In the case of chosen technologies, since high-tech 
firms benefit from trade and low-tech firms do not export, there is always a positive growth 
effect, and the number of firms increases. Therefore, the model predicts that although average 
size increases, the number of firms may increase or decrease with exposure to trade depending 
on whether technologies are randomly assigned or chosen by the firms. As in Melitz, trade does 
not affect markups. 
Predictions of Recent Models of Trade with Firm Heterogeneity 
           
Model  Number of firms  Size of firms  Markup 
      
Melitz (2003)  Decreases  Increases  No Change 
Bernard, et al. (2003)  Decreases  Increases  No Change 
Yeaple (2005)  Decreases  Increases  No Change 
Bernard, et al. (2007)  Decreases  Increases  No Change 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)  Decreases Increases  Decreases 
Emami-Namini and López (2008)  Decreases/Increases* Increases  No Change 
           
* Result depends on whether technologies are randomly assigned (number of firms may increase or 
decrease) or chosen by the firms (number of firms increases). 
 
Based on these models, the following testable hypothesis can be proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Opening to trade may increase or decrease the number of firms. In the case of a 
decrease, this should be more important in comparative advantage industries.  
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Hypothesis 2: Opening to trade increases the average firm size, and this increase should be 
more important in comparative advantage industries. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Opening to trade may reduce or keep firms’ markup constant. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Basic Treatment Effects Model 
This paper uses a treatment effects estimation method, which allows us to study the impact of 
exposure to trade (the treatment) on the liberalizing group (the treated group) relative to the 
countries that did not liberalize (the control group). To this purpose we look at the pre- and 
post-treatment effects on the liberalizing countries relative to the control group. We identify 
the effect of trade liberalization as the estimated difference-in-difference of the outcome 
variables (e.g., number of firms) between the two groups of countries. 
  This methodology is implemented by estimating the following equation: 
0 , i c t c ticti c t y Liberalization e α βδ δ δ =+ ++++       ( 1 )  
where  ict y  is the outcome of interest for industry i in country c at time t;  ct Liberalization  is a 
step variable equal to 1 in the years after the liberalization in the treated countries and 0 
otherwise (see Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005),  i δ  is vector of industry-fixed effects,  c δ  is vector 
of country-fixed effects, and  t δ  is vector of time-fixed effects. In some specifications we replace 
the industry fixed effects for industry specific time trends,  * i t δ . This allows us to control for  
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time-varying unobserved industry characteristics that may affect the outcomes.8 We are 
particularly interested in the sign of the parameter 0 β . If trade liberalizations reduce the 
number of firms and markups, then  0 β  should be negative. For the case of average size,  0 β  
should be positive and for markups  0 β  is expected to be negative. 
  To construct the variable  ct Liberalization  we classify countries as “opened” or “closed” using 
the Sachs and Warner (1995) indicator of trade openness, recently updated by Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003). The treatment group includes all those countries that opened to trade during the 
period under study. This measure is not free of problems. First, countries liberalizing trade may 
have also undertaken other structural reforms. Then, we must understand this exercise as one 
that looks at the effects of overall economic reforms. Second, aggregates measures of 
liberalization are used to define a country as “opened,” therefore, they are not specific to the 
manufacturing industry. Finally, there are some countries, such as Canada, which are open all 
the years in the sample and belong to our control group, but that have experienced a reduction 
in trade costs as result of bilateral free trade agreements. These last two shortcomings are likely 
to bias our results against finding a relationship between liberalization and industry-specific 
variables. 
  We also estimate a variant of equation (1) to examine if the impact of trade liberalization 
differs across industries depending on a country comparative advantage. According to Bernard, 
Redding and Schott (2007), the impact trade liberalization is proportionally larger in those 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Aghion et al. (2003).  
  13
industries where the economy has a comparative advantage. Therefore, we estimate a variant of 
(1): 
1 *, ict o ct ct ict i c t ict y Liberalization Liberalization CV e α ββ δ δ δ =+ + ++++    (2) 
where  it CV  is some variable indicating whether or not country c has a comparative advantage 
in industry i. In this case, both  o β  and  1 β have to be negative for the number of firms, positive 
for the average firm size and negative for markups. The parameter  1 β  captures how 
disproportionate is the effect of trade liberalization for comparative advantage industries. 
  It is not an easy to identify the industries in which a country has comparative advantage. 
Similar to the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model, in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) 
comparative advantage depends on the interaction between relative factor abundance and 
factor use intensities. In their model, this is determined by two factors, skilled and unskilled 
labor. Here we follow the literature on revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and use the 
traditional Balassa indicator of RCA. This has the advantage of being simple of calculate and it 
is very intuitive.9 This indicator is computed as: 













=          ( 3 )  
where  X measures current dollar exports, 10 c denotes the country, i the industry and w the 
world. 
                                                 
9 This is, however, not exempt of critiques. See, for example, De Benedictis and Tamberi (2001).  
10 We also experiment with net exports and the results are similar.  
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  Using this indicator, we rank comparative advantage industries using the median for 
industries in each country. Comparative advantage industries are those with a Balassa indicator 
above the median in the year of liberalization. By defining this as a dummy variable in the year 
of liberalization we isolate changes in the ranking of industries over time due to trade reforms. 
In the case that we do not have information for the year of the reform, we use one or two lags 
of the Balassa index. 
3.2 Model with Time-Varying Treatment Effects 
  It is possible that the treatment effects are not constant over time and that they manifest 
either before or after the treatment is received. For example, the number of firms may change a 
few years after the liberalization or may change before the liberalization in anticipation to the 
reforms. If the effects of trade reform are spread out over a number of years, then a constant 
instantaneous effect of trade reform may be misspecified. For this reason, we also estimate (1) 
and (2) using the method recently proposed by Laporte and Windmeijer (2005), which allows 
the treatment effects to vary over time. This approach introduces flexibility into the analysis 
and corrects possible misspecification problems. 
  Following Laporte and Windmeijer (2005), we estimate the following equation: 
 
3, 3 2, 2 1, 1 0 0, 0 1, 1 2, 2 ... ...
         ,
ict c c c ct c c c
icti c t
y P P P Liberalization P P P
e
α γγγβ κ κ κ
δδδ
−− −− −− =++ + + + + + + +
++++
  
where  ,, () cj c j PP −  are pulse variables that take a value of 1 j  periods before (after) the reform 
and 0 everywhere else. We are interested in the parameters  j γ − , which attempt to estimate the 
treatment effects j periods before the trade reform,  0 β  which tries to capture the long-run  
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treatment effect, and  j κ which attempt to estimate deviations from the long run effect j periods 
after the trade reform. 
  In this approach, the effects of trade liberalizations are allowed to differ over time. This 
method permits examining if the effects of trade reforms occur before the liberalization is 
implemented. This could happen if there is uncertainty on the exact start date of the treatment 
or when some of the expected outcomes take place in anticipation to the treatment. In this 
context, it can be particularly relevant to analyze the effect before the year indicated as that of 
liberalization because trade barriers and other restrictions are reduced before that year. It may 
be the case that most of the adjustment occurs before the year of liberalization if the most 
important trade barriers are reduced before that date or if firms anticipate the decrease in trade 
barriers. For this methodology, we also estimate two specifications. The first includes industry-
specific effects and the second controls for industry-specific trends.11  
 
4. Data 
  The data was obtained from the last actualization of the World Bank’s Trade Production 
Dataset that uses data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization's 
Industrial Statistics Database at the three-digit level of the ISIC (Rev 2).12 Since not all the 
countries have information for every year and industry, the panel is unbalanced. In addition, 
the number of establishments is only available from 1981. We are, therefore, constrained to use 
                                                 
11 Given that the results are similar when including country-specific trends, we only estimate these two 
specifications. 
12 See Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) for details.  
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liberalization episodes after 1981. The average size of establishments is computed as the total 
number of employees divided by the number of establishments in each industry and year. We 
calculate markups as in Braun and Raddatz (2008):  
    Markup = (Value of Sales – Payroll – Cost of Materials) / Value of Sales.  
  There are some problems with this dataset that need to be addressed. First, some countries 
have very limited data availability. For example, Argentina has data for only three years (1985, 
1993 and 1994). In other cases, most notably Brazil, the information is limited to a few 
industries. Then, we decide to use as filter that each country has information for at lest 10 years 
and more than 20 industries. Second, we have also excluded countries for which the 
information is clearly misleading. For example, the average number of establishment for 
Bangladesh increased from 171 to 880 in only one year (1988 to 1989). In all these cases, these 
countries are dropped from the sample. After all these cleaning procedures, we have 46 
countries. 22 of these countries constitute our treatment group –liberalized after 1981- and the 
rest are our control group –have been open over the period under study. In Table 1 we present 
descriptive statistics for years of liberalization episodes.  
  The list of countries in our control and treatment groups is shown in appendix 1. As we can 
see, treated countries include nations located in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and 
Oceania. A good control group should include countries that are “similar” to the treatment 
group (Meyer, 1995). Although it is not clear what this means in practice (Slaughter, 2001), the 
fact that our control countries are located in the same 5 geographic areas as the treated  
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countries suggests that the control group may be appropriate for this exercise.13 Moreover, we 
think it is unlikely that a shock may have systematically affected the treated group differently 
than the control group.14 
  Before estimating the model, we examine the behavior of the variables of interest before 
and after the liberalization year for our treated group of countries. To illustrate the changes 
potentially attributable to the reforms, we plot the median across countries of the three 
variables 5 years before (t-5) and 5 years after (t+5) the year of liberalization for the 28 
manufacturing industries. In general, as it is shown in Figure 1, most of the industries 
experience an increase in the number of establishments, except for 4 manufacturing sectors. 
The mean and median change across industries between both years is 35.8% and 34.2%, 
respectively. In the case of establishments’ size, for all the industries there is a reduction in this 
variable (see Figure 2). The decrease in this variable is impressive. The average and median 
reductions are 105.8% and 106.2%, respectively. Finally, markups tend to increase when we 
compare the situation before and after the liberalization year. There are only two industries in 
which the markups decrease between both years (Figure 3). The mean and median increases in 
markups are 5.2 and 4.9 percentage points, respectively.     
  This evidence may be consistent with the fact that we are summarizing our interest 
variables for countries having comparative advantage in different industries. In order to analyze 
                                                 
13 In section 6 we address this issue in more detail. We exclude industrial countries from treatment group and we 
include other control variables, among other robustness checks, and the results are similar to the basic model.  
14 For instance, the debt crisis of 1982 affected countries in both groups in similar ways (e.g., Mexico, which is 
treated, and Chile which is a control).  
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how the evolution of these variables differs by type of industries, we show an event study for 
both groups of industries taking the median of the three variables around a liberalization 
episode. This exercise is presented in Figure 4 for the number establishments, Figure 5 for the 
average size and in Figure 6 for markups. In general, the results are fairly similar to those found 
before. Trade liberalization episodes seem to be accompanied by an increase in the number of 
firms, a reduction in size, and an increase in markups. 
  A potential problem with analyzing the evolution of these variables only for treated 
countries is that they can reflect worldwide trends in industry dynamics. We need to look at 
the performance of liberalizing countries in comparison with the control group. As we show in 
Figures 7 through 9, the evolution of these variables for the control group show a similar 
pattern to that observed for liberalizing countries. Especially in the last part of the period, there 
has been an increase in the number of establishments and a reduction in the average size of 
establishments. The case for markups seems to be different. In fact, although there are some 
fluctuations over time, these are very small. The range for this variable is between 20.0% and 
22.5%.         
 
5. Results 
  The basic results of the constant treatment effects model are presented in Table 2 (for the 
number of establishments), Table 3 (for the average size, total employment/number of 
establishments), and Table 4 (for markups). In all these three tables, the dependent variable is 
measured in logs, so that the parameter of the liberalization dummy can be interpreted as  
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100(exp(β0) -1) change in percentage terms. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the results with the 
liberalization dummy, while (4), (5), and (6) include the interaction term between the 
liberalization dummy and the indicator of comparative advantage.15  
  Table 2 shows that for the number of establishments that the dummy for liberalization is 
positive, which is the opposite of what most models of trade predict, but it is never significant. 
This result is robust to the inclusion of industry time trends and country time trends, which 
controls for time-varying unobserved industry and country characteristics. The interaction 
term with the dummy for comparative advantage industries, however, is positive and 
significant (see columns (4), (5) and (6)), suggesting that trade liberalizations increase the 
number of firms in sectors in which countries have a comparative advantage. This is exactly the 
opposite of what most theoretical models would predict. It is consistent, however, with 
dynamic models in which firms can choose their technologies (e.g., Emami-Namini and López, 
2008). 
  Table 3 shows the results for the size of establishments. Here we expected the estimate for 
liberalization to be positive, but it is always negative. But the interaction term, is positive and 
significant, which indicates that size increases in comparative advantage industries. This is 
consistent with Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007), which predicts that average size increases 
more in comparative advantage industries.  
                                                 
15 In columns (1) and (4) we control for industry and country differences using a set of industry-specific and 
country-specific dummy variables. In columns (3) and (5) we include industry-specific trends, and in columns (4) 
and (6) we include country-specific trends. All specifications also include year-specific dummy variables.   
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  Finally, Table 4 shows the results for markups. Although the estimates for the liberalization 
dummy are always negative, as we expected, they are not statistically significant. The 
interaction terms are not significant either.  
  In summary, we find some evidence consistent with the idea that increases in trade 
exposure increase the average size of firms in comparative advantage industries. But the 
estimates for the number of establishments are the opposite of what we expected. 
  In all these regressions it was assumed that the treatment effects are constant. But treatment 
effects may vary over time. They could manifest either before (in anticipation of) the reform, or 
after (with a lag) the reform. Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the results of estimating the model with 
time-varying treatment effects proposed by Laporte and Windmeijer (2005). Columns (1) and 
(2) show the basic results, while (3) and (4) include interaction term between the treatment 
effects and the comparative advantage indicator. 
  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, show that the liberalization dummy is still positive but not 
significant, suggesting that trade reforms do not have a long-run effect on the number of 
establishments. It appears, however, that the number of establishments decreases the year of 
the reform but the estimate is not significant either. In columns (3) and (4) we show the results 
with interaction terms between liberalization and comparative advantage. Now we see that in 
years before the trade reform and during the year of the reform, the number of firms increases 
in comparative advantage industries. The estimate for the liberalization step variable interacted 
with the dummy for comparative advantage industries is positive and significant indicating that 
there is a long-run treatment effect of the reform in comparative advantage industries. Again,  
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this is inconsistent with most recent static trade models although it could be consistent with 
dynamic models of trade. 
  Table 6 shows that the estimate for the liberalization variable is negative but not significant 
implying that the reform does not have long-run effects on the size of firms. But the estimates 
for the pulse variables corresponding to 3 years after the reform are negative and significant. 
This may be interpreted as deviations from the long run effect and suggests that most of the 
effect of the reforms appears several years after they are introduced. But the negative sign is the 
opposite of what we expected. Moreover, these effects seem to be larger in comparative 
advantage industries. The estimate for the interaction term between the step variable and the 
dummy for comparative advantage industries is positive and significant indicating that there is 
a positive long-term effect on the size of firms in comparative advantage industries, which is 
consistent with the theory. The estimate for the year of the liberalization is positive, indicating 
that trade reforms increase the average size in that year in addition to the long-run treatment 
effect. The size of firms also increases in comparative advantage industries during the year 
before the trade liberalization. 
  The effects of trade reforms in markups are presented in Table 7. Here the results are more 
consistent with the theory. The estimates for the liberalization dummy are never significant 
even when interacted with the dummy for comparative advantage industries. Thus, trade 
reforms do not have a long-run impact on markups. But the estimates for the pulse dummies in 
the second, third, and fourth year after the liberalization are negative and significant. These 
deviations from the long-run effect suggest that most of the impact of trade reforms shows up  
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after the reform was introduced. The finding that markups decrease after the reforms is robust 
to the inclusion of the interaction terms with comparative advantage as well as the inclusion of 
industry specific time trends. These results confirm finding from previous studies that focus on 
particular episodes of trade reforms (e.g., Krishna and Mitra, 1998). 
 
6. Robustness  Checks 
  There are several concerns regarding the identifying assumptions in our difference-in-
difference estimation. First, there may be other unobserved variables affecting both groups 
differently. The main concern is on the similarity between the control and treatment group. 
This has been partially addressed by using industry and country fixed effects, and industry and 
country trends. By including these variables we control for unobserved and time varying 
characteristics at the country and the industry level. The industry and country trends control 
for changes over time that are country and industry specific.  
  Second, given the potential endogeneity of trade liberalization, our estimations could be 
biased and inconsistent. This problem is originated by omitted variables that could affect both 
the independent variables and the measures of trade liberalization. In the absence of good 
instruments for the trade liberalization measures, we try to reduce this potential bias by (i) 
performing the difference-in-difference estimation on similar countries, i.e., excluding 
industrial countries and, following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), including year-continent 
specific effects, and (ii) incorporating additional control variables that could be potentially 
affecting the results. In order to do that, we include as control variables the size of the country  
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(measured by population), a time varying measure of distance to markets (measured as in 
Leamer (1997)),16 a measure of financial development (credit to private sector as percentage of 
GDP), and the real exchange rate.17  
  The motivation for including these variables comes from the theoretical models discussed in 
previous sections. The size of a country determines the number (and size) of firms operating in 
the industry, because larger countries may accommodate a larger number of firms.18 The 
distance variable attempts to capture the effects of trade barriers that are not specific to policies. 
In fact, countries that are closer to international markets face lower transport costs (and 
potentially lower exporting fixed costs) than more distant economies. The financial 
development variable is included to control for differences in countries ability to finance new 
activities. Finally, by controlling for real exchange rate we want to capture the effect of trade 
liberalizations and not from the exchange rate fluctuations accompanying trade liberalization.19 
  We present the results in Tables 8, 9, and 10 for the number of establishments, size and 
markups. The evidence is similar to what we found with the basic model, which gives us 
confidence that our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables and the 
exclusion of industrial countries.  
 
 
                                                 
16 This is computed as  6 . 0
1
6 . 0 ) (
−
− ∑ = ij
j
jD w DM , where wj is the share of country j in world GDP, and captures how 
distant is a country to world GDP.   
17 To maximize the number of observation we use bilateral real exchange rate with the United States.  
18 Note also that it has been argued that smaller countries tend to be more open to international trade. 
19 Li (2004) shows evidence that real exchange depreciates after economies open to trade.   
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7. Conclusions 
Recent trade models with firm heterogeneity predict that trade liberalization decreases the 
number of firms, increases the average size of the surviving firms, and reduces their markups. 
This paper uses a large data set for 28 industries in 46 countries to test these three predictions. 
Unlike previous studies, we employ a treatment effect approach and estimate the differential 
impact of trade reforms on countries that liberalize relative to countries that did not reform 
during the same time period. 
  The results show that the number of firms does not decrease after trade reforms, although it 
increases in comparative advantage industries. The average size of firms increases but only in 
sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage. Finally, we find that markups 
decrease during the three and four years after the reform.   
  The results of this paper generate several questions that may need to be addressed in the 
trade literature. For example, why does the number of firms do not move according to the 
predictions of recent models of trade? One possibility is that most models of trade are 
essentially static. They do not incorporate dynamic optimization of consumers in ways that 
physical or human capital is accumulated. Judging by the results in Emami-Namini and López 
(2008), allowing for dynamics may generate different implications for the number of firms. The 
finding that in comparative advantage industries the number of firms tends to increase is 
consistent with models of trade that incorporate firm heterogeneity (Bernard et al., 2007). It is 
not clear, however, why the size of firms does not increase in other industries as well. Finally,  
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the negative effect on markups suggests that models with endogenous markups, as in Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008), can be better suited to explain the effects of trade on firms’ markup. 
  One limitation of the type of exercise we perform in this paper is that we do not analyze the 
effects of trade liberalization in trading partners. It could be the case that countries reduce their 
own trade barriers to other countries without necessarily facing lower barriers in those 
countries. Several of the theoretical models discussed in this paper have implications for 
industry dynamics when trade costs are reduced and the profitability of exports increase due to 
lower trade barriers in trading partners. Unfortunately, this is the best one can do with the data 
available. Moreover, previous studies have followed similar approaches to analyze how trade 
liberalization affects industry performance in liberalizer countries (Pavcnik, 2002, Roberts and 
Tybout, 1996). The results of this paper complement this evidence and suggest that it may be 
important to develop new theoretical models which can explain these new empirical results.   
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Table 1: Trade Liberalization Episodes 
Year of Liberalization  Frequency  Percent 
    
1985 1  4.2 
1986 3  12.5 
1988 1  4.2 
1989 2  8.3 
1990 1  4.2 
1991 4  16.7 
1993 2  8.3 
1994 2  8.3 
1995 5  20.8 
1996 3  12.5 
Total 24  100.0 




Table 2: Trade Liberalization and the Number of Establishments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Liberalization  0.125 0.125 0.133 0.031 0.031 0.039 
  (0.90) (0.90) (0.96) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) 
Liberalization *Comparative Advantage        0.263  0.263  0.263 
       (2.54)*  (2.53)*  (2.54)* 
Constant  7.336 6.289 5.876 7.314 6.284 5.867 
  (48.58)** (52.75)** (69.56)** (48.92)** (53.07)** (70.38)** 
Industry  dummies  Yes No No Yes No No 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Industry-specific trends  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country-specific trends  No  No  Yes  No No Yes 
Number of Observations  20,982  20,982 20,982 20,982 20,982 20,982 
R-squared  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 




  Table 3: Trade Liberalization and Size of Establishments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Liberalization -0.272 -0.272 -0.276 -0.437 -0.437 -0.441 
  (1.61) (1.61) (1.63) (2.36)*  (2.37)*  (2.38)* 
Liberalization * Comparative Advantage        0.448  0.448  0.448 
      (4.03)**  (4.03)**  (4.03)** 
Constant  3.606 3.274 3.651 3.570 3.265 3.605 
  (21.90)** (24.18)** (38.76)** (22.52)** (24.47)** (42.38)** 
Industry  dummies  Yes No No Yes No No 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Industry-specific trends  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country-specific trends  No  No  Yes  No No Yes 
Observations  20,204 20,204 20,204 20,204 20,204 20,204 
R-squared  0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 





Table 4: Trade Liberalization and Markups 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Liberalization -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) 
Liberalization * Comparative Advantage        0.045  0.045  0.044 
      (1.26)  (1.25)  (1.25) 
Constant -1.812  -1.410 -1.876 -1.816 -1.411 -1.878 
  (23.72)** (32.57)** (43.94)** (23.59)** (32.85)** (44.12)** 
Industry  dummies  Yes No No Yes No No 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Industry-specific trends  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country-specific trends  No  No  Yes  No No Yes 
Observations  23,809 23,809 23,809 23,809 23,809 23,809 
R-squared  0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Robust t statistics clustered at country-level in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
















Table 5: Trade Liberalization and the Number of Establishments 
Time Varying Treatment Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Liberalization  (LIB)  0.130 0.130 0.045 0.046 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.16) (0.17) 
Year Liberalization (P0) -0.069  -0.069  -0.128  -0.129 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.65) (0.65) 
1 Year before (P-1) 0.050  0.050  -0.068  -0.068 
  (0.41) (0.40) (0.53) (0.53) 
2 Years before (P-2) 0.040  0.040  -0.093  -0.094 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.81) (0.81) 
3 Years before (P-3) 0.015  0.015  -0.129  -0.129 
  (0.16) (0.16) (1.22) (1.22) 
4 Years before (P-4) 0.012  0.012  -0.150  -0.150 
  (0.13) (0.13) (1.58) (1.58) 
1 Year after (P1) -0.164  -0.165  -0.205  -0.206 
  (0.85) (0.85) (1.09) (1.10) 
2 Years after (P2) -0.049  -0.049  -0.123  -0.123 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.65) (0.65) 
3 Years after (P3)  0.128 0.128 0.078 0.077 
  (0.77) (0.77) (0.47) (0.47) 
4 Years after (P4)  0.018 0.018 0.005 0.005 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) 
5 Years after (P5)  0.079 0.079 0.038 0.037 
  (0.65) (0.65) (0.31) (0.30) 
6 Years after (P6)  0.171 0.170 0.181 0.180 
  (1.50) (1.49) (1.53) (1.52) 
7 Years after (P7)  0.153 0.152 0.156 0.156 
  (1.51) (1.50) (1.51) (1.50) 
8 Years after (P8)  0.270 0.270 0.315 0.315 
  (2.53)* (2.52)* (2.14)* (2.14)* 
LIB * Comp. Adv  -  -  0.233  0.233 
 -  -  (2.64)*  (2.63)* 
P0 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.147  0.148 
 -  -  (1.65)  (1.66) 
P-1 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.312  0.312 
 -  -  (3.02)**  (3.02)** 
P-2 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.342  0.342 
 -  -  (3.02)**  (3.02)** 
P-3 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.375  0.376 
 -  -  (3.33)**  (3.33)** 
P-4 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.435  0.435 
 -  -  (4.00)**  (4.00)** 
P1 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.100  0.101 
 -  -  (0.76)  (0.77) 
P2 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.202  0.202 
 -  -  (1.47)  (1.47) 
P3 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.126  0.127 
 -  -  (1.08)  (1.08) 
P4 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.023  0.023 
 -  -  (0.20)  (0.20) 
P5 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.096  0.096 
 -  -  (0.85)  (0.86) 
P6 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  -0.045  -0.045 
 -  -  (0.37)  (0.37) 
P7 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  -0.021  -0.021 
 -  -  (0.18)  (0.18) 
P8 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  -0.126  -0.126 
 -  -  (0.75)  (0.75) 
Constant  7.362 6.315 7.314 6.297 
  (38.48)** (33.65)** (38.51)** (33.38)** 
Observations  20,982 20,982 20,982 20,982 
R-squared  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 





Table 6: Trade Liberalization and Size of Establishments 
Time Varying Treatment Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Liberalization (LIB)  -0.058  -0.059  -0.232  -0.232 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.78) (0.78) 
Year Liberalization (P0) -0.112  -0.112  -0.028  -0.028 
  (0.66) (0.65) (0.17) (0.17) 
1 Year before (P-1) -0.070  -0.070  -0.143  -0.143 
  (0.51) (0.51) (1.13) (1.13) 
2 Years before (P-2) -0.006  -0.006  -0.070  -0.070 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.63) (0.63) 
3 Years before (P-3)  0.042 0.042 0.001 0.001 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.01) (0.01) 
4 Years before (P-4)  0.061 0.061 0.031 0.031 
  (0.69) (0.69) (0.37) (0.37) 
1 Year after (P1) -0.085  -0.085  -0.040  -0.040 
  (0.54) (0.54) (0.25) (0.25) 
2 Years after (P2) -0.169  -0.169  -0.118  -0.118 
  (1.10) (1.10) (0.83) (0.83) 
3 Years after (P3) -0.322  -0.321  -0.282  -0.282 
  (2.26)* (2.26)* (2.10)* (2.09)* 
4 Years after (P4) -0.200  -0.200  -0.217  -0.217 
  (1.69) (1.69) (1.78) (1.78) 
5 Years after (P5) -0.343  -0.343  -0.344  -0.344 
  (3.12)** (3.12)** (3.41)** (3.40)** 
6 Years after (P6) -0.367  -0.367  -0.447  -0.447 
  (3.27)** (3.27)** (3.42)** (3.41)** 
7 Years after (P7) -0.290  -0.290  -0.344  -0.344 
  (2.79)** (2.79)** (2.88)** (2.88)** 
8 Years after (P8) -0.455  -0.455  -0.524  -0.524 
  (3.83)** (3.83)** (3.59)** (3.59)** 
LIB * Comp. Adv  -  -  0.440  0.440 
 -  -  (4.82)**  (4.81)** 
P0 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  -0.189  -0.190 
 -  -  (2.30)*  (2.30)* 
P-1 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.200  0.200 
 -  -  (3.65)**  (3.65)** 
P-2 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.171  0.171 
 -  -  (2.17)*  (2.17)* 
P-3 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.111  0.111 
 -  -  (1.19)  (1.19) 
P-4 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.070  0.070 
 -  -  (0.72)  (0.72) 
P1 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  -0.086  -0.086 
 -  -  (0.66)  (0.66) 
P2 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  -0.084  -0.084 
 -  -  (0.57)  (0.57) 
P3 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  -0.075  -0.076 
 -  -  (0.65)  (0.66) 
P4 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.087  0.087 
 -  -  (0.71)  (0.71) 
P5 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.023  0.022 
 -  -  (0.31)  (0.30) 
P6 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.246  0.245 
 -  -  (1.79)  (1.79) 
P7 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.173  0.173 
 -  -  (1.27)  (1.27) 
P8 * Comp.Adv.  -  -  0.231  0.231 
 -  -  (1.30)  (1.29) 
Constant  3.612 3.279 3.585 3.284 
  (19.12)** (20.53)** (19.99)** (21.53)** 
Observations  20,204 20,204 20,204 20,204 
R-squared  0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 




Table 7: Trade Liberalization and Markups 
Time Varying Treatment Effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Liberalization (LIB)  0.025  0.025  0.002  0.002 
 (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Year Liberalization (P0) -0.015  -0.015  -0.014  -0.014 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
1 Year before (P-1) -0.039  -0.039  -0.058  -0.058 
 (0.68)  (0.68)  (1.01)  (1.01) 
2 Years before (P-2) -0.033  -0.033  -0.040  -0.040 
 (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.65)  (0.65) 
3 Years before (P-3) 0.005  0.005  0.038  0.038 
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.61)  (0.61) 
4 Years before (P-4) -0.044  -0.044  -0.032  -0.032 
 (0.97)  (0.97)  (0.61)  (0.61) 
1 Year after (P1) -0.164  -0.163  -0.197  -0.197 
 (2.55)*  (2.55)*  (3.26)**  (3.26)** 
2 Years after (P2) -0.143  -0.143  -0.168  -0.168 
 (2.48)*  (2.48)*  (2.37)*  (2.37)* 
3 Years after (P3) -0.083  -0.082  -0.070  -0.070 
 (1.44)  (1.44)  (1.21)  (1.21) 
4 Years after (P4) -0.053  -0.053  -0.032  -0.032 
 (0.86)  (0.86)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
5 Years after (P5) -0.004  -0.004  0.022  0.022 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.31)  (0.32) 
6 Years after (P6) -0.011  -0.011  0.059  0.059 
 (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.99)  (0.99) 
7 Years after (P7) 0.082  0.082  0.099  0.099 
 (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.37)  (1.37) 
8 Years after (P8) 0.041  0.041  0.023  0.023 
 (0.79)  (0.79)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
LIB * Comp. Adv      0.050  0.050 
     (0.75)  (0.75) 
P0 * Comp.Adv.      -0.002  -0.002 
     (0.02)  (0.02) 
P-1 * Comp.Adv.      0.043  0.043 
     (0.95)  (0.95) 
P-2 * Comp.Adv.      0.016  0.016 
     (0.22)  (0.22) 
P-3 * Comp.Adv.      -0.067  -0.067 
     (1.56)  (1.56) 
P-4 * Comp.Adv.      -0.027  -0.027 
     (0.53)  (0.53) 
P1 * Comp.Adv.      0.076  0.076 
     (0.79)  (0.79) 
P2 * Comp.Adv.      0.057  0.057 
     (0.51)  (0.51) 
P3 * Comp.Adv.      -0.027  -0.027 
     (0.38)  (0.38) 
P4 * Comp.Adv.      -0.048  -0.047 
     (0.66)  (0.66) 
P5 * Comp.Adv.      -0.056  -0.056 
     (0.79)  (0.79) 
P6 * Comp.Adv.      -0.154  -0.154 
     (2.54)*  (2.54)* 
P7 * Comp.Adv.      -0.038  -0.037 
     (0.53)  (0.53) 
P8 * Comp.Adv.      0.049  0.049 
     (0.98)  (0.98) 
Constant -1.812  -1.409  -1.815  -1.410 
 (23.72)**  (32.68)**  (23.51)**  (32.96)** 
Observations 23,809  23,809  23,809  23,809 
R-squared 0.39  0.39  0.40  0.40 





Table 8: Trade Liberalization and Number of Establishments, Robustness 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Liberalization  0.021 0.043  0.025 
  (0.10) (0.29)  (0.25) 
Liberalization *Comparative Advantage  0.278 0.233  0.258 
  (2.98)** (2.85)**  (3.72)** 
Year*Continent Dummies  Y  Y  Y 
Industrial countries excluded  N  Y  Y 
Other controls  N  N  Y 
          Population (logs)  N  N  Y 
          Distance to markets (log)  N  N  Y 
          Financial development   N  N  Y 
          Real exchange rate (log)  N  N  Y 
Constant 5.890  3.784  -13.508 
 (64.20)**  (19.26)**  (1.37) 
Observations 20,982  13,653  11,185 
R-squared 0.85  0.81  0.83 




Table 9: Trade Liberalization and Size of Establishments, Robustness 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Liberalization -0.533 -0.476  -0.362 
 (2.75)**  (3.03)**  (4.03)** 
Liberalization *Comparative Advantage  0.394  0.344  0.270 
 (4.55)**  (3.89)**  (4.26)** 
Year*Continent Dummies  Y  Y  Y 
Industrial countries excluded  N  Y  Y 
Other controls  N  N  Y 
          Population (logs)  N  N  Y 
          Distance to markets (log)  N  N  Y 
          Financial development   N  N  Y 
          Real exchange rate (log)  N  N  Y 
Constant 4.531  4.488  10.451 
 (15.81)**  (15.45)**  (0.84) 
Observations 20,204  12,946  10,687 
R-squared     0.67  0.66  0.70 
Robust t statistics clustered at country-level in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table 10: Trade Liberalization and Markups, Robustness 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Liberalization 0.002  -0.027  0.008 
 (0.04)  (0.47)  (0.14) 
Liberalization *Comparative Advantage  0.042  0.041  0.039 
 (1.19)  (1.09)  (1.20) 
Year*Continent Dummies  Y  Y  Y 
Industrial countries excluded  N  Y  Y 
Other controls  N  N  Y 
          Population (logs)  N  N  Y 
          Distance to markets (log)  N  N  Y 
          Financial development   N  N  Y 
          Real exchange rate (log)  N  N  Y 
Constant -1.878  -2.317  7.958 
 (39.92)**  (18.62)**  (2.18)* 
Observations 23,809  14,245  12,375 
R-squared 0.40  0.36  0.40 
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Appendix 1: Control and Treated Countries 
 Control      Treated 
        
AUS AUSTRALIA    ARM  ARMENIA 
AUT AUSTRIA    AZE  AZERBAIJAN 
BLX BELGIUM-LUX    BOL  BOLIVIA 
CAN CANADA    COL COLOMBIA 
CHL CHILE    CRI  COSTA  RICA 
CYP CYPRUS    ECU ECUADOR 
DNK DENMARK    EGY  EGYPT 
FIN FINLAND    SLV  EL  SALVADOR 
DEU GERMANY    ETH  ETHIOPIA 
GRC GREECE    HND  HONDURAS 
IDN INDONESIA    HUN  HUNGARY 
IRL IRELAND    KEN  KENYA 
ITA ITALY    KGZ  KYRGYZSTAN 
JPN JAPAN    LVA LATVIA 
KOR KOREA  REP.    MEX  MEXICO 
MUS MAURITIUS    MOZ  MOZAMBIQUE 
NLD NETHERLANDS    NZL  NEW  ZEALAND 
NOR NORWAY    PER  PERU 
SGP SINGAPORE    PHL PHILIPPINES 
ESP SPAIN    MDA  REP.MOLDOVA 
SWE SWEDEN    TZA TANZANIA 
GBR UNTD.KINGDOM   TUN  TUNISIA 
     TUR  TURKEY 
     VEN  VENEZUELA 
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